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Abstract 
 
We have reported previously [1] results of a study 
with a sample of bug reports from four off-the-shelf 
SQL servers. We checked whether these bugs caused 
failures in more than one server. We found that very 
few bugs caused failures in two servers and none 
caused failures in more than two. This would suggest 
a fault-tolerant server built with diverse off-the-shelf 
servers would be a prudent choice for improving 
failure detection. To study other aspects of fault tol-
erance, namely failure diagnosis and state recovery, 
we have studied the “data diversity” mechanism and 
we defined a number of SQL rephrasing rules. These 
rules transform a client sent statement to an addi-
tional logically equivalent statement, leading to more 
results being returned to an adjudicator. These rules 
therefore help to increase the probability of a correct 
response being returned to a client and maintain a 
correct state in the database.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Fault tolerance is frequently the only viable ap-
proach of obtaining the required system dependability 
from systems built out of “off-the-shelf” (OTS) prod-
ucts [2]. There are various methods in which this fault 
tolerance can be achieved ranging from simple error 
detection and recovery add-ons (e.g. wrappers [3]) to 
diverse redundancy replication using diverse versions 
of the components.  
These design solutions are well known. Questions 
remain, however, about the dependability gains and 
implementation difficulties for a specific system. 
We have studied some of these issues in SQL da-
tabase servers, a very complex category of off-the-
shelf products. We have previously reported [1] re-
sults from a study with a sample of bug reports from 
four off-the-shelf SQL servers so as to assess the pos-
sible advantages of software fault tolerance - in the 
form of modular redundancy with diversity - in com-
plex off-the-shelf software. We found that very few 
bugs cause failures in two servers and none cause 
failures in more than two, which would indicate that 
significant dependability improvements can be ex-
pected from the deployment of a fault-tolerant server 
built out of diverse off-the-shelf servers in compari-
son with individual servers or the non-diverse repli-
cated configurations.  
Although we found that using multiple diverse 
SQL servers can dramatically improve error detection 
rates it does not make them 100%, e.g. our study [1] 
found four bugs causing identical non-self-evident 
failures in two servers. Thus there is room for im-
proving failure detection further. Many of the cases, 
in which a failure was detected did not allow for im-
mediate diagnosis of the failed server. Fault tolerance 
requires also diagnosing the faulty server and main-
taining data consistency among the databases in addi-
tion to failure detection. To improve the situation, we 
studied the mechanism called “data diversity” by 
Ammann and Knight [4] (who studied it in a different 
context). The simplest example of the idea in [4] re-
fers to computation of a continuous function of a con-
tinuous parameter. The values of the function com-
puted for two close values of the parameter are also 
close to each other. Thus, failures in the form of dra-
matic jumps of the function on close values of the 
parameter can not only be detected but also corrected 
by computing a “pseudo correct” value. This is done 
by trying slightly different values of the parameter 
until a value of the function is calculated which is 
close to the one before the failure. This was found [4] 
to be an effective way of detecting as well as masking 
failures, i.e. delivering fault-tolerance. Data diversity, 
thus, can help with failure detection and state recov-
ery, and thus complement fault-tolerance solutions 
which employ diverse modular redundancy, as well as 
helping achieve a certain degree of fault tolerance 
without employing diverse modular redundancy.  
Data diversity is applicable to SQL servers be-
cause of the inherent redundancy that exists in the 
SQL language: statements can be “rephrased” into 
different, but logically equivalent [sequences of] 
statements. While working with the bug reports we 
found examples where a particular statement causes a 
failure in a server but a rephrased version of the same 
statement does not. Examples of such statements of-
ten appear in bug reports as “workarounds”. 
In this paper we provide details of how SQL re-
phrasing can be employed systematically in a fault-
tolerant server and provide examples of useful re-
phrasing rules. We also report on performance meas-
urements using the TPC-C [5] benchmark client im-
plementation to get some initial estimates of the de-
lays introduced by rephrasing.  
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we 
give details of the architecture of a fault-tolerant 
server employing rephrasing. In section 3 we give 
details of the data diversity study we have conducted 
for defining SQL rephrasing rules and illustrate how 
one of these rules has been used as a workaround for 
two known bugs of two SQL servers. In section 4 we 
give some empirical results of experiments we have 
conducted to measure the performance penalty due to 
rephrasing. In section 5 we discuss some general im-
plications of our results and finally in section 6 some 
conclusions are presented with possibilities for fur-
ther work. 
 
2. Architecture of a Fault-Tolerant Server  
 
2.1 General Scheme 
 
Data replication is a well-understood subject [6], 
[18], [7]. The main problem replication protocols 
deal with is guaranteeing consistency between copies 
of a database without imposing a strict synchronisa-
tion regime between them. A study which compared 
various replication protocols in terms of their per-
formance and the feasibility of their implementation 
can be found in [8]. Existing protocols implement 
efficient solutions for this problem, but depend on 
running copies of the same (non-diverse) server. 
These schemes would not tolerate non-self-evident1 
failures that cause incorrect writes to the database or 
                                                           
1 In [1] we classified the failures according to their detect-
ability by a client of the database servers into: Self-Evident 
failures - engine crash failures, cases in which the server 
signals an internal failure as an exception (error message) 
and performance failures; Non-Self-Evident failures: incor-
rect result failures, without server exceptions within an 
accepted time delay. 
that return incorrect results from read statements. For 
the former, incorrect writes would be propagated to 
the other replicas and for the latter, incorrect results 
would be returned to the client. This deficiency can 
be overcome by building a fault-tolerant server node 
(“FT-node”) from two or more diverse SQL servers, 
wrapped together with a “middleware” layer to ap-
pear to each client as a single SQL server. An illustra-
tion of this architecture with two diverse Off-The-
Shelf servers (“O-servers”) is shown in Fig. 1. A brief 
explanation of the figure follows. Several nodes 
(computers) are depicted which run client applica-
tions (Client node 1, Client node 2 and Client node 3) 
or server applications (Middleware node, RDBMS 1 
node and RDBMS 2 node). The bottom three nodes 
together form the FT-server. Components may share a 
node: e.g. Replication Middleware, and the two SQL 
connectors for dialects 1 and 2 are deployed on the 
Middleware node.  The SQL connectors additionally 
contain the SQL rephrasing rules. The diagram as-
sumes that the Off-The-Shelf servers (O-servers) run 
on separate nodes, RDBMS 1 node and RDBMS 2 
node. The circles represent the interfaces through 
which the components interact. Each SQL connector, 
implements the SQL Connector API interface used by 
the Replication Middleware component. This, in turn 
implements the Middleware API interface via which 
the client applications access the FT-server, either 
directly or via a driver for the FT-server in a specific 
run-time environment, e.g. JDBC driver or .NET 
Provider. 
Further improvements to this architecture would 
be to also run diverse replicas of the middleware 
component. We have described elsewhere [9], [2] in 
more detail the FT-node architecture. Here we will 
only elaborate on the parts relevant to the discussion 
of rephrasing. 
 
2.2 SQL Connectors 
 
The O-servers are not fully compatible: they 
“speak different dialects” of SQL, despite being com-
pliant at various levels with SQL standards. Therefore 
the FT-server includes a translator between these dia-
lects, defined for a subset of SQL (e.g. “SQL-92 entry 
level”) plus some more advanced features important 
for enterprise applications (such as TRIGGERs and 
STORED PROCEDUREs). The translators are depicted 
as “SQL Dialect Connector’s” in Fig 1. 
A similar idea (implemented in [10], [11]) is to re-
define the grammar of one database server to make it 
compatible with that of another while keeping the 
core database engine unchanged. 
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Fig. 1 - UML Deployment diagram of the FT-server. 
  
2.3 Failure Detection, Masking, Recovery 
 
The middleware of the FT-server includes extensive 
functionality for failure detection, masking and state 
recovery. Self-evident server failures are detected as in 
a non-diverse server, via server error messages (i.e. via 
the existing error detection mechanisms inside the 
servers), and time-outs for crash and performance fail-
ures. Diversity gives the additional capability of detect-
ing non-self-evident failures by comparing the outputs2 
of the different O-servers. In a FT-node with 3 or more 
diverse O-servers, majority voting can be used to 
choose a result and thus mask the failure to the clients, 
and identify the failed O-server which may need a re-
covery action to correct its state. With a 2-diverse FT-
node, if the two O-servers give different results, the 
middleware cannot decide which O-server is in error. 
                                                           
2 An “output” may be the results from a SELECT statement 
or the number of rows affected for a write (INSERT, 
UPDATE and DELETE) statement. For INSERT and 
UPADTE statements a more refined way would be to read 
back the affected rows and use those for comparison. 
This is where “data diversity” can help by providing 
additional results to break the tie (more in the next sub-
section). State recovery of the database can be obtained 
in the following ways: 
• via standard backward error recovery, which will be 
effective if the failures are due to transient failures 
(caused by so called “Heisenbugs” [12]). To com-
mand backward error recovery, the middleware may 
use the standard database transaction mechanisms: 
aborting the failed transaction and replaying its 
statements may produce a correct execution. With 
“data diversity” a finer granularity level of recovery 
is possible using SAVEPOINTs and ROLLBACKs; 
• additionally, diversity offers ways of recovering 
from non-transient failures (caused by so called 
“Bohrbugs” [12]), by essentially copying the data-
base state of a correct server into the failed one 
(similarly to [13]). Since the formats of the database 
files differ between the servers, the middleware 
would need to query the correct server[s] for their 
database contents and command the failed server to 
write them into the corresponding records in its da-
tabase, similar to what is proposed in [14]. This 
would be expensive, perhaps to be completed off-
line, but a designer can use multi-level recovery, in 
which the first step is to correct only those records 
that have been found erroneous on read statements. 
 
2.4 Data Diversity Extensions 
 
Even with just two diverse O-servers, many of the 
O-server failures may be masked by using “data diver-
sity” (rephrasing an SQL statement into a different, but 
semantically equivalent one) to solicit “second opin-
ions” from the O-servers and if possible outvote the 
incorrect response. 
Data diversity could be implemented via an algo-
rithm in the “Middleware Node” that rephrases state-
ments according to predefined rules. We can define 
these rules for each type of SQL statement defined by 
the SQL grammar implemented by the server. These 
rules therefore may form part of the “SQL Dialect Con-
nectors“. Upon receiving a statement from a client ap-
plication the middleware can look up a rule from the 
list of available rules and rephrase the statement. The 
middleware must allow for new rules to be defined as 
and when necessary. If the middleware exhausts the list 
of rules that it can apply to a certain statement but no 
“correct result”3 can be established by applying the 
closed adjudication mechanism then an error message 
is returned to the client. 
Data diversity can be used with or without design 
diversity. Architectural schemes using data diversity 
are similar to those using design diversity. For instance, 
Amman and Knight in [4] describe two schemes, which 
they call “retry block” and “n-copy programming”, 
which can also be used for SQL servers. The “retry 
block” is based on backward recovery. A statement is 
only rephrased if either the server “fail-stops” or its 
output fails an acceptance test. In “n-copy program-
ming”, a copy of the statement as issued by the client is 
sent to one of the O-servers and rephrased variant(s) 
are sent to the others; their results are voted to mask 
failures.  
Data diversity allows for a finer-granularity of state 
recovery, which is facilitated by the implementation of 
“SAVEPOINT” and “ROLLBACK” within transactions. 
The procedure (written in pseudocode), for a statement 
within a transaction, is given at the end of this subsec-
tion. 
A performance optimization could be to perform ad-
judication at an intermediate step of the WHILE loop 
execution rather than at the end (e.g. for a “majority 
                                                           
3 Depending on the setup used a correct result could be either 
the majority result or one that passes an acceptance test. 
voting” adjudication, if there are five rules for a par-
ticular statement then could check after the execution 
of the first three rephrased versions of the statement 
whether results returned by each of them are identical; 
if yes then majority result is already obtained and there-
fore no need for the last two rephrased versions of the 
statement to be executed).  
The SAVEPOINT and ROLLBACK approach is the cor-
rect way of ensuring the “isolation” property of an 
ACID transaction.4 Otherwise, if we “ABORTed” the 
transaction and started a new one to perform the re-
phrased version of the statement, a concurrent transac-
tion may have updated rows in the target table. This 
would lead to different results being returned by the O-
server for the rephrased statement even though the be-
havior is not faulty. 
WHILE more rephrasing rules available for the statement DO 
IF WRITE (i.e. DML (INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE) or DDL (e.g. 
CREATE VIEW etc.)) statement THEN 
SAVEPOINT; 
Execute WRITE statement[s] produced by the current re-
phrasing rule; 
READ the rows amended by the WRITE statement; 
Store the results produced by the preceding READ state-
ment; 
ROLLBACK TO last SAVEPOINT; 
ELSE IF READ (i.e. SELECT) statement THEN  
Execute READ statement[s] produced by the current re-
phrasing rule; 
Store the results produced by the READ statement; 
END IF 
END WHILE 
Adjudicate from the stored results produced by each rephrased version 
of the statement; 
IF adjudication succeeds (e.g. “majority voting” produced a result) THEN 
Execute the statement which was adjudicated to be correct; 
ELSE 
ABORT current Transaction 
Raise an exception; 
END IF 
 
3. SQL Rephrasing Rules 
 
As explained in section 2, the support for data di-
versity can be implemented in the middleware in the 
form of rephrasing rules. The initial step is defining the 
rules that are to be implemented. The rules can be de-
fined by studying in depth the SQL language itself to 
identify the parts of the language which are synony-
mous and therefore enable the definition of logically 
equivalent rephrasing rules. We took a different more 
                                                           
4 This is under the assumption that the ACID property of the 
transaction is failure-free. 
direct approach to defining these rules: we studied the 
known bugs reported for 4 open-source servers, namely 
Interbase 6.0, Firebird 1.05, PostgreSQL 7.0 and Post-
greSQL 7.2 (abbreviated IB 6.0, PG 7.0, FB 1.0 and 
PG 7.2 respectively). However our intention was not to 
simply define workaround rules which are highly bug 
specific, but instead to define generic rephrasing rules, 
which can be used in a broader setting. As a result we 
found that some of the generic rules that we defined 
could be applied to multiple bugs in our study. We 
provide examples next. 
 
3.1 Generic Rules 
 
The “generic rules” are rephrasing rules, which can 
be applied to a range of ‘similar’ statements, be it DML 
(data manipulation language: SELECT, INSERT, 
UPDATE and DELETE) or DDL (data definition lan-
guage e.g. CREATE TABLE etc.) statements. We have 
defined a total of 14 generic rephrasing rules. Full de-
tails of these rules are in [15]. We will provide details 
of Rule 8 and how it proved to be a useful workaround 
for two different bugs reported for two different serv-
ers.  
Rule 8: An SQL VIEW can be rephrased as an 
SQL STORED PROCEDURE or SQL TEMPORARY 
TABLE 
This rule proved to be a useful workaround for FB 
1.0 Bug 488343 [16]. To observe the failure the bug 
report details the following setup: 
CREATE TABLE CUSTOMERS (ID INT, NAME, VARCHAR(10) ); 
CREATE TABLE INVOICES (ID INT, CUST_ID INT, CODE 
VARCHAR(10), QUANTITY INT);  
INSERT INTO CUSTOMERS VALUES (1, 'ME');    
INSERT INTO INVOICES VALUES (1, 1, 'INV.1', 5); 
INSERT INTO INVOICES VALUES (2, 1, 'INV.2', 10); 
INSERT INTO INVOICES VALUES (3, 1, 'INV.3', 15); 
INSERT INTO INVOICES VALUES (4, 1, 'INV.4', 20); 
The following VIEW is faulty (specifically, the use 
of the SQL DISTINCT keyword to filter the results of a 
SELECT statement is faulty in SQL VIEWs of the FB 
1.0 server): 
CREATE VIEW V_CUSTOMERS AS SELECT DISTINCT ID, NAME 
FROM CUSTOMERS;  
The failure can be observed by issuing the follow-
ing statement:  
SELECT SUM(INV.QUANTITY) FROM INVOICES INV INNER JOIN 
    V_CUSTOMERS CUST ON INV.CUST_ID = CUST.ID; 
SUM 
20 
                                                           
5 Firebird is the open-source descendant of Interbase 6.0. The 
later releases of Interbase are issued as closed-development 
by Borland. 
The expected result is 50 not 20. If we use a 
STORED PROCEDURE instead of the VIEW then the 
correct results is returned6: 
SET TERM !!; 
CREATE PROCEDURE V_CUSTOMERS RETURNS  (ID INT, NAME 
VARCHAR(10)) AS 
BEGIN 
FOR SELECT DISTINCT ID, NAME FROM CUSTOMERS 
INTO :ID, :NAME DO 
BEGIN 
SUSPEND; 
END 
END!! 
SET TERM; !! 
Issuing the same SELECT statement as before we 
obtain the expected result (50): 
SELECT SUM(INV.QUANTITY) FROM INVOICES INV INNER JOIN 
V_CUSTOMERS CUST ON INV.CUST_ID = CUST.ID; 
SUM 
50 
The same rule was a useful workaround for another 
bug, this time the PG 7.0 bug 23 [17]. To observe the 
failure the bug report details the following setup: 
CREATE TABLE L (PID INT NOT NULL, SEARCH BOOL, SERVICE 
BOOL); 
INSERT INTO L VALUES (1,'T','F'); INSERT INTO L VALUES (1,'T','F'); 
INSERT INTO L VALUES (1,'T','F'); INSERT INTO L VALUES (1,'T','F'); 
INSERT INTO L VALUES (1,'T','F'); INSERT INTO L VALUES (1,'F','F'); 
INSERT INTO L VALUES (1,'F','F'); INSERT INTO L VALUES (2,'F','F'); 
INSERT INTO L VALUES (3,'F','F'); INSERT INTO L VALUES (3,'T','F'); 
The following VIEWs are then defined (notice the 
use of the GROUP BY clause): 
CREATE VIEW CURRENT AS SELECT PID, COUNT(PID), SEARCH, 
SERVICE FROM L GROUP BY PID, SEARCH, SERVICE; 
CREATE VIEW CURRENT2 AS SELECT PID, COUNT (PID), 
SEARCH, SERVICE FROM L GROUP BY PID, SEARCH, SERVICE; 
By issuing the following SELECT statement incor-
rect results are obtained (this is due to the GROUP BY 
clause used in the VIEWs and the COUNT used on a 
column from a VIEW): 
SELECT CURRENT.PID, CURRENT.COUNT AS SEARCHTRUE, 
CURRENT2.COUNT AS 
SEARCHFALSE FROM CURRENT,CURRENT2 WHERE 
CURRENT.PID =CURRENT2.PID AND CURRENT.SEARCH='T' 
AND CURRENT2.SEARCH='F' AND CURRENT.SERVICE='F' AND 
CURRENT2.SERVICE='F'; 
--  pid | searchtrue | searchfalse 
--     1  |          10      |           10 
--     3  |          1        |           1 
The expected results are: 
--  pid | searchtrue | searchfalse 
--     1  |          5        |           2 
--     3  |          1        |           1 
                                                           
6 The syntax used is specific for Firebird. 
By using TEMPORARY TABLEs instead of VIEWs the 
correct result is obtained: 
SELECT PID, COUNT(PID), SEARCH, SERVICE INTO TEMP 
  CURRENT FROM L GROUP BY PID, SEARCH, SERVICE; 
SELECT PID, COUNT(PID), SEARCH, SERVICE INTO TEMP 
CURRENT2 FROM L GROUP BY PID, SEARCH, SERVICE; 
SELECT CURRENT.PID,CURRENT.COUNT AS SEARCHTRUE, 
CURRENT2.COUNT AS SEARCHFALSE FROMCURRENT, 
CURRENT2 WHERE CURRENT.PID=CURRENT2.PID AND 
CURRENT.SEARCH='T' AND CURRENT2.SEARCH='F' AND 
CURRENT.SERVICE='F' AND CURRENT2.SERVICE='F'; 
 --  pid | searchtrue | searchfalse 
--     1  |          5         |           2 
--     3  |          1         |           1 
We used TEMPORARY TABLEs in PG 7.0 and not 
STORED PROCEDUREs since PG 7.0 does not support 
functions (procedures) that return multiple rows.  
Details of the other generic rephrasing rules and 
how they can be used as workarounds for other re-
ported bugs are given here [15].  
We looked at how many of the generic rules can be 
applied to the bugs reported for the open-source servers 
in our bugs study. The results are shown in Table 1. 
The leftmost three columns of the table show the re-
sults for the non-self-evident failures caused by read 
(i.e. SELECT) statements. Clearly, a number of these 
are also classified as a “user error”, i.e. the user issues 
an incorrect statement, which the server incorrectly 
executes without raising an exception. For example IB 
6.0 incorrectly executes a statement such as SELECT X 
FROM A, B even though the column X is defined in 
both tables A and B, which can lead to ambiguous re-
sults. PG 7.0 / PG 7.2, correctly, raise an exception.  
If we take away the “user error” bugs then we can 
see that in all the server pairs the generic rules can be 
used as workarounds for at least 80% of the non-self-
evident failures caused by read statements. 
The right-most 4 columns of the table are for the 
bugs that cause state-changing failures, which have 
been further subdivided into bugs in DDL and write 
statements. We can see that generic rules can be used 
as workarounds for at least 60% of failures caused by 
the state-changing statements. 
 
3.2 Specific Rules 
 
The generic rephrasing rules that we have defined 
do not provide workarounds for all the failures caused 
by the bugs collected in our study. For these failures 
specific workaround rules need to be defined. For ex-
ample recursive BEFORE UPDATE TRIGGERS can re-
turn error messages in FB 1.0/IB 6.0 which means the 
table for which the trigger is defined becomes unusable 
(FB 1.0 bug 625899 [16]). A generic rule could not be 
defined for this bug. A specific workaround (and a ge-
neric recovery procedure) upon encountering this error 
message would be to: 
• disable the trigger in FB 1.0 / IB 6.0 
• read the log of the other server to check the se-
quence of the write statements that have been issued 
as a result of the trigger 
• send this sequence of statements explicitly to the 
FB 1.0 / IB 6.0 server 
The workaround above would work in a diverse 
server-type configuration if the other server[s] works 
correctly (the other server[s] in our study do not con-
tain this bug) while without design diversity a fault, 
clearly, cannot be dealt with this way.  
We have found that a large number of bugs, if 
server diversity is not employed, would require very 
specific rules to be defined to workaround the failures 
that they cause. In many cases these rules require sub-
stantial new implementation in the form of “wrapping” 
of the results returned to the client (or for write state-
ments before they are stored in the database) or re-
implementing parts of the functionality of the database 
that are found to be faulty and no workaround exists in 
SQL. Although possible such an approach is clearly 
limited because the newly developed code can itself be 
faulty which may diminish the gains in reliability that 
can be obtained from its use. This reiterates that design 
diversity is desirable.  
 
4. Performance Implications of Rephrasing 
 
To measure the performance implications of re-
phrasing, we conducted a number of experiments based 
Table 1. A summary of applying the generic rephrasing rules for non-self evident and state-
changing bugs of IB 6.0 and PG 7.0 and the later releases FB 1.0 and PG 7.2 
State-changing failures  
Server pair 
Non-self evident non-state-changing fail-
ures (SELECT statements) DDL statement failures Write statement failures 
 Total 
Total covered 
by generic rules 
Total user 
errors * 
Total 
Total covered 
by generic rules 
Total 
Total covered by 
generic rules 
IB 6.0 + PG 7.0 21 12 6 21 13 9 7 
IB 6.0 + PG 7.2 26 18 6 19 13 7 5 
FB 1.0 + PG 7.0 16 11 2 19 13 8 6 
FB 1.0 + PG 7.2 19 15 2 17 13 6 4 
on the industry standard benchmark for databases - 
TPC-C [5]7. The factors which degrade performance 
when rephrasing is employed are: 
1. delays enforced by the middleware for comparison 
of results 
2. delays from using the following mechanisms within 
transactions: 
• Transaction SAVEPOINTs 
• Transaction ROLLBACKs 
• Execution of SELECT statements after WRITE 
statements (INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE) 
• Rephrasing 
The additional delay introduced by the use of re-
phrasing is delay 2. We have performed an experimen-
tal study to estimate delay 2. Delay 1 would exist also 
in a diverse setup with or without rephrasing. Studies 
that have reported measures of other delays which are 
not specific to rephrasing (such as enforcing 1-copy 
serialisability) can be found in [18], [6] 8. There are 
other factors that can influence the degradation of per-
formance that we have not measured in our experimen-
tal setup (e.g. rephrasing delays when more than one 
rephrasing rule is used etc.). The experiments that we 
have conducted aim to provide an initial estimate of the 
delays due to rephrasing. A more thorough perform-
ance evaluation should also take into account concur-
rent execution of transactions. As was also noted by 
one of the anonymous reviewers, for some concurrency 
control mechanisms, the increase in transaction execu-
tion times due to the use of rephrasing, the probability 
of conflicts due to concurrency may also increase 
which may further degrade performance. 
The experimental setup consisted of three com-
puters. All three computers ran on Microsoft’s Win-
dows 2000 operating system, they had 384 MB RAM, 
and Intel Pentium 4 1.5GHz processors. One machine 
hosted the client implementation of the TPC-C bench-
mark. The other two machines hosted the servers 
(PostgreSQL 8.0 and Firebird 1.5). We used later re-
leases of the servers than the ones used in our bugs 
study since these earlier releases do not support SAVE-
POINTs and ROLLBACKs within transactions. We have 
not used any commercial servers in our experiments 
since the license agreements are very restrictive with 
regard to publishing performance data.  
We ran experiments on both diverse and non-
diverse setups. In the diverse experiments we always 
wait for the slowest server response before we can start 
                                                           
7 The TPC-C experiments were carried out with 1 emulated 
client and 1 warehouse with client think times set to 0. 
8 These studies also provide some optimisation procedures 
for 1-copy serialisability. 
the next transaction. Therefore the diverse setups here 
are always slower (other configurations are possible 
and we have discussed some of these in [9]). 
Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of executions 
within a transaction for the different non-diverse set-
ups. The grey boxes represent the fault tolerance 
mechanism used whereas the dotted lines represent the 
added delay from the use of the respective mechanism. 
Setup a) is the baseline, against which we will measure 
the added delays. Setups b), c), and d) measure the 
delays of using the fault tolerance mechanisms when no 
failures are observed (i.e. the cost of being cautious)9. 
Setups e) and f), measure the cost of re-execution of a 
statement10. These experiments measure delays for a 
number of situations: 
• re-execution of an unchanged statement as a possi-
ble protection against transient failures (caused by 
the so called “Heisenbugs” [12]) 
• re-execution of a logically equivalent rephrased 
statement in case the first one has failed self-
evidently (i.e. a crash or other exceptional failures) 
• re-execution of a logically equivalent rephrased 
statement to get additional results for comparison 
on the middleware to increase the likelihood of 
failure detection for non-self-evident failures 
In our experiments we did not use rephrased state-
ments. Instead, the same statement was executed twice. 
This is a simplification due to the absence of a proper 
implementation of rephrasing. In the absence of any 
other data, we wanted to get an initial estimate of the 
delays that the various fault tolerance mechanisms will 
produce with the database servers. 
The diverse setups have a similar structure. The only 
difference is that in diverse setups we only use 1 
SAVEPOINT (at the beginning of the transaction) rather 
than before each write statement and therefore we may 
also have only one ROLLBACK (at the end of transac-
tion). For setups e) and f), this means that we first exe-
cute every statement once then we ROLLBACK to the 
beginning and execute all the statement again. So the 
difference between the diverse and non-diverse setups 
is a different level of granularity of using SAVE-
POINTs/ROLLBACKs. 
                                                           
9 b) detection of erroneous writes; c) SAVEPOINT are used 
before write statements for finer grained recovery; d) both 
SAVEPOINTs are used and the modified rows are read back  
(combination of b) and c));  
10 e) optimistic (on writes) rephrasing: each statement is exe-
cuted twice; to ensure that the state of the database remains 
unchanged during the second execution of the write state-
ment we use SAVEPOINTs and ROLLBACKs; f) pessimis-
tic rephrasing: same as e) but the written rows are also read 
to protect against erroneous writes. 
 
Fig. 2. A transaction execution sequence in the experimental setups. The shaded boxes represent 
the fault tolerant mechanism used and the dotted lines represent the additional delays from their 
use. The second executions of the statements are proxies for rephrased versions of statements.
The full results of these experiments are given in 
Table 2. The first column explains the setup under 
which the experiment was run. The following 4 col-
umns spell out which fault tolerance mechanisms were 
used (if the cell is blank then the respective mechanism 
was not used). The following 3 columns show the aver-
age execution time of a transaction, and the last 3 col-
umns show the added delay (in percentages) propor-
tional to the baseline of each setup. The first six rows 
contain the results for each of the setups we explained 
earlier (and illustrated in Figure 2).  
The last two rows are structurally the same as setups 
(e) and (f) respectively. However in these experiments 
we have tried to simulated the effect of a simple learn-
ing rule: if after 1000 executions a statement has been 
found to be correct then we stop rephrasing (in our 
simulation it means we stop executing the statement 
twice for both setups and additionally stop executing 
the SELECT statement that read the modifications of the 
write statements for setup (h)). 
The delays seem to be higher proportionally in 
PostgreSQL than in Firebird. This is because the exe-
cution time of COMMITs is smaller in Firebird for the 
experiments with larger number of SELECT statements. 
The number of write statements to be COMMITed al-
ways remains the same in all experiments (even in the 
ones with 2 executions of statements, since the first 
execution of a write statement is always ROLLBACKed). 
Comparing the setups a) with e) we can see that even 
though in setup e) every statement is being executed 
twice the average execution times of the transactions 
are not simply twice the execution time of transactions 
in setup a). This is explained by the fact that the num-
ber of transactions remains the same (i.e. we still have 
the same number of COMMITs) and also the data may 
be stored already in the RAM which reduces the execu-
Table 2 Performance effects of the various fault-tolerance schemes. Each experiment is run 
with loads of 10,000 transactions 
Setup 
Average Transaction Execution 
time (milliseconds) 
Delays proportional to the 
baseline (%) 
Setup description (with reference to  
Figure 3) 
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PG 
8.0 
FB 
1.5 
Diverse PG 
8.0 & FB 1.5 
PG 
8.0 
FB 
1.5 
Diverse 
PG 8.0 
& FB 
1.5 
Baseline (a)     228 306 343    
Detection of erroneous writes (b)    √ 292 356 434 28.3 16.3 26.5 
Finer granularity of recovery (c) √    240 308 350 5.3 0.4 1.8 
Combination of b and c (d) √   √ 305 364 433 33.9 18.6 26.0 
Optimistic (on writes) Rephrasing (e) √ √ √  353 450 489 54.9 46.9 42.3 
Pessimistic Rephrasing (f) √ √ √ √ 496 601 699 118.
1 
96.2 105.5 
Learning Optimization (g) √ √ √  256 325 402 12.6 6.2 17.3 
Learning Optimization (h) √ √ √ √ 278 341 524 22.5 11.4 52.6 
tion time of the second statement. The same holds 
when comparing results of setups b) with f).  
Since the numbers in Table 2 represent point estimates 
(i.e. they are single runs of an experiment per setup) we 
have repeated the experiments for setup a) and f) to 
measure the non-deterministic variation that may exist 
between the different runs. We observed a very small 
difference (less than 1% for 5 out of six of the experi-
ments and less than 3% for all). Hence we can trust 
with a higher degree of confidence that the observa-
tions documented in table 2 represent closely the ‘true’ 
differences between different setups. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
We presented in section 2 the architecture we pro-
pose for a fault-tolerant server employing rephrasing. 
The middleware used would make use of a rephrasing 
algorithm. Any fault-tolerant solution, which makes use 
of server diversity would need to have “connectors” 
developed as part of the middleware to translate a cli-
ent sent statement to the dialect of the respective 
server. This is because each server ‘speaks’ its own 
dialect of SQL. The rephrasing algorithms can also be 
part of these connectors. A related point is that data-
base servers offer features that are extensions to the 
SQL standard, and these features may differ between 
the servers. Therefore for applications which require a 
richer set of functionality data diversity would be at-
tractive alone as it would for instance allow applica-
tions to use the full set of features. A complex state-
ment, which can be directly executed with some servers 
but not others, may need to be rephrased as a logically 
equivalent sequence of simpler statements for the latter. 
For example, the TRUNCATE command is a Post-
greSQL specific feature (and is buggy in version 7.0; 
see bug 20 [17] for details). In its stead the DELETE 
command can be used to workaround the problem. The 
DELETE command is also implemented in Firebird and 
all the other SQL compliant servers.  
Since most of these rules are transformations of the 
SQL grammar, they are amenable to formal analysis. 
Thus, despite the additional implementation, high reli-
ability can be achieved with a combination of formal 
analysis and testing of the new code. 
The results presented in section 3 demonstrate that a 
small number of rephrasing rules can help with server 
diagnosis and state recovery. We observed that a lim-
ited set of generic rephrasing rules that we have defined 
(14 in total) can be used as workarounds for at least 
80% of the non-self-evident failures caused by read 
statements and at least 60 % of failures caused by write 
or DDL statements in any of the open-source 2-diverse 
setups in our study. We have also observed that using 
data diversity without design diversity would lead to a 
large number of specific rephrasing rules to work-
around certain failures. Implementing such rules might 
require a substantial amount of new implementation, 
which itself may be faulty, thus, reducing the possible 
reliability gains that can be obtained from their use.  
Rephrasing has been proposed as a possibility to de-
tect failures that would otherwise be un-detectable in 
some replication settings. The possible benefits of this 
approach could be its relatively low cost in comparison 
with design diversity, and also that it can be used with 
or without design diversity allowing for various cost-
dependability trade-offs. Possible setups include: 
• In non-diverse redundant replication settings, if 
high dependability assurances are required, the only 
option available would be to rephrase all the state-
ments sent to the server. This can lead to high per-
formance penalties. To reduce the performance 
penalty some form of learning strategy can be ap-
plied, e.g. keep track of all the statements that have 
been rephrased. If the rephrased statement keeps 
giving the same results as the original statement 
then confidence is gained that the original statement 
is giving the correct result and the statement does 
not have to be rephrased in future occurrences 
(what we did in setups g) and h) of the TPC-C ex-
periments). The other dimension is to stop sending 
the client-version of the statement to a server if it 
always gives an incorrect result. In this case the 
middleware can flag each occurrence of this state-
ment and use the rephrased version of it without 
sending the original statement to the server [2]. This 
reduces the time taken to respond to the client. 
• In a diverse server configuration a less rephrasing-
intensive approach may be used where only the read 
statements (i.e. SELECTs) that return different re-
sults are rephrased (assuming that at least two serv-
ers are running in parallel so that a mismatch is de-
tected). The rephrasing is also done for all the write 
statements (to ensure that the state of the database is 
not corrupted). Since a smaller set of statements 
needs to be rephrased the performance is enhanced. 
The non-self-evident identical failures, however, 
(we observed 4 of these in the study with known 
bugs of SQL servers [1]) will not be detected. To 
further enhance the performance the same learning 
strategies can be used as in the previous setup. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have reported previously [1] on the dependabil-
ity gains that can potentially be achieved from deploy-
ing a fault-tolerant SQL server, which makes use of 
diverse off-the-shelf SQL servers. From studying bugs 
reported for four off-the-shelf servers we reported that 
failure detection rates in 1-out-of-2 configurations was 
at least 94% and this increased to 100% in configura-
tions which employed more than two servers.  However 
fault tolerance is more than just failure detection. In 
this paper we reported on the mechanism of data diver-
sity and its application with SQL servers in aiding with 
failure diagnosis and state recovery. We have defined 
14 generic ‘workaround rules’ to be implemented in a 
‘rephrasing’ algorithm which when applied to a certain 
SQL statement will generate logically equivalent 
statements. We have also argued that since these rules 
are transformations of the SQL language syntax, they 
are amenable to formal analysis and dependability 
gains from employing rephrasing are achievable de-
spite the development of a bespoke new code.   
We also outlined a possible architecture of a fault 
tolerant server employing diverse SQL servers and 
detailed how the middleware used in it can be extended 
to also handle rephrasing of SQL statements. 
We also presented some performance measurements 
from experiments we have run with an implementation 
of the TPC-C benchmark [5], which gave initial esti-
mates of the likely delays due to employing rephrasing. 
Further work that is desirable includes: 
• demonstrating the feasibility of automatic transla-
tion of SQL statements from, say ANSI/ISO SQL 
syntax to the SQL dialect implemented by the de-
ployed SQL servers. We have completed some pre-
liminary work on implementing translators between 
MSSQL and Oracle dialects for SELECTs, and be-
tween Oracle and PostgreSQL dialects for SELECT, 
INSERT and DELETE statements; 
• developing the necessary components so that users 
can try out diversity in their own installations, since 
the main obstacle now is the lack of popular off-
the-shelf “middleware” packages for data replica-
tion with diverse SQL servers. This would also in-
clude implementing a mechanism of maintaining 
(adding/removing) rephrasing rules as add-on com-
ponents in the middleware. 
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